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THE SEVEN CHARACTERISTICS OF SENTIENCE.
(1997)
PAUL S. SIDLE.
Humanity often provides me with the justifications for despair; especially the human species' collective disregard for the welfare of the other life forms, the bio-sphere, etc., on this planet-as-a-whole with which we share. Instead it seems easy for our power (whether co-ordination [leadership] or-both exchange [wealth]) orientated institutions to find 'motives' (Latin mōtīvum, to move: impulse for 'action'; will, striving, 'purpose' ['action(s)' {Latin actiōnem, doing: exertion of energy, influence, etc.; process of doing, performing, preventing, etc} having an aim; equivalent to 'motivation'], etc.; for humans feeling-thinking investment) to neutralize the concerns of the compassionate. Indeed the problem remains multi-causal, not simply due to any economic (Greek oikonomikos from oikonomein, to manage a household: concerned with functional processes of wealth) systems which advocates profit, squandering our precious resources, etc., but that our notion of democracy (Greek dēmokratia: emerges from a function of individuals self-determinism in a participation) is falsely based on a contradictory notion of 'centralization of power', as in a 'government'('control by a minority elite') by the people. Yet it appears too simple to blame a family who in order to survive in a society that values money, otherwise exchange of-or-both for commodities, as to not take the easier path by conforming. However where this becomes commonplace through the 'conditionality' (after Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1906), 'associative' learning [Latin associāre: after Aristotle (350 B.C.), to form connexion(s) accustomed in joining: 'associations' are false relations between two events occurring {hence ordered} in spatio-temporal contiguity {action-by-contact}; after David Hume (1739)], the expectancy [likelihood of occurrence(s) from experience(s)] of a fixed space-time contingency [likelihood of one event followed by another], such that one event will follow another; involving for example 'Pavlovian conditioning', after Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1906), contingent contiguous 'associations' of 'stimuli'; equivalent to 'identification(s)', etc) of society-education-culture, for example 'greed' ('ego-centricity': preoccupied with 'self-wants', 'materialism', etc), 'self-centredness' (preoccupied with 'self-views'), etc. Further many readily believe in some form of an anthropocentric (Greek anthropo, man; centred) principle that animals-both plants 'exist for their chosen uses'. We continue to pump ozone destroying or-both global warming chemicals into the atmosphere. Meanwhile, no matter what we may eventually agree to do, our world-wide population continues to increase. Yet there appears even worse, in the indiscriminate slaughter (specific only for the use(s) required) of other possible emergent-emerging (Latin ēmergere: to appear, become apparent, formed newly from dependent parts) sentient (Latin sentiens of sentīre, to 'feel': conscious from Latin conscius, aware: as in emergent self-awareness, etc.; though confusingly refers to the minimum capacity to 'feel') species, hence genocide.
Nevertheless, an investigation involving the characteristics of sentience may seem surprisingly premature. Especially when it would appear as many would argue, that the human species remains the only clear candidate in any comparisons of unusual abilities. Yet the landscape is by no means as barren as it might appear, a number of species appear credible candidates for an emerging sentience. For example, Chimpanzees demonstrate an aptitude for learning language, etc., such as reported by Trixie with Allen Gardner (1972) with their chimp Washoe using American sign language; co-operation in hunts for Red Colabus monkeys, etc., reported by Jane Goodall (1990); further a use of tools, including using twigs to fish for termites as reported by Jane Goodall (1971), etc.; insight problem-solving such as stacking boxes in order to climb up to obtain bananas, as described by Wolfgang Köhler (1925), etc.; Thomas Breuer (2005), reports upon a Gorilla's use of a piece of wood as a depth gauge as she wades into a swampy pool, in the Republic of Congo's Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park, as reported by "New Scientist", 8 October 2005. Refer to Figures 4-8. While Elephants demonstrate a remarkable memory for example of water holes; further co-operation, for example in digging a calf out of the mud; etc. However amongst them the most remarkable group, hence best candidate for sentience remains the Cetaceans.
Figure 1-3.
Jane Goodall (1990) with Goblin; Flo (1971) using a grass tool to catch Termites; Pom (1990) fishing for Termites. Jane (Van Lawick-)Goodall (1971) "In The Shadow Of Man". Jane Goodall (1990) "Through A Window: Thirty Years With The Chimpanzees Of Gombe".
Figure 4-8.
Kurt Köhler's (1925), experiment demonstrating insight formation in Chimpanzees. From Kurt Köhler's (1925),
"The Mentality Of Apes".
John Lilly (1960-70s) wrote about Cetaceans having large, complex brains (Greek brechmos, forehead: nervous organic [Greek organikos, instrument: of organs, organized
Figure 9.
John Cunningham Lilly
(January 6, 1915 – September 30, 2001).
physical structures, etc] material found in skulls of vertebrates; neuro-physiological [Greek neuron, nerve cells; phusio from phusis, nature; logos, discourse: Science of organic functioning of nervous system] basis of emergent 'mental' functioning, etc), along with his conviction that these organisms have a high level of non-human sentience. From scientific experiments Lilly (1950-60s) along with others claimed to show that Dolphins communicate not only with one another but further with humans, mimicking human speech, hence reaching out across the boundaries that divide us. The brain size of many species of Cetacean remains large comparable to that of the human brain, for example Bottle-nose Dolphins (Tursiops Truncatus), along with Sperm whales (Physeter Catadon), the largest brain evolved. However Lilly became ridiculed, ostracized, etc., by many of his colleagues; criticizing that these views about dolphin 'intelligence' along with communication has not withstood critical scrutiny. Arguing that since brain size tends to increase with 'body' size, then brain size cannot be necessarily a measure of 'intelligence'. For example, as Lyall Watson (1981) argues:
"Brain size on its own is no measure of intelligence: elephants have brains which weigh four times as much as our own, but they are not necessarily four times as intelligent". Instead researchers have used brain weight to 'body' length, weight of brain as a percentage else ratio of 'body' weight, otherwise the ratio of brain volume to 'body' surface area (encephalisation quotient, EQ), as arguments to weaken any claims for high 'intelligence'. For example Antony Alpers (1960) gives brain weight per foot of 'body' length for Bottle-nose dolphins as just under 7 ounces to that of 8, 1/2 ounces for humans in comparison. Whereas Peter G.H. Evans (1987) gives brain weight as a percentage of the 'body' weight as varying between 0.25-1.5 for a number of odontocetes (dolphins, porpoises, with small toothed whales), compared with 1.9 percent in humans. M. Gihr with Giorgio Pilleri (1979) gives brain to 'body' weight as a ratio of 1:76 for Bottle-nose dolphins compared to 1:50 for a human. Whilst H.J. Jerison (19800 has suggested an EQ of c. 5.6 for Bottle-nose dolphins compared to humans of c. 7.4. However such arguments of brain weight/volume to 'body' weight/length/surface area, ratios, or-both percentages, are not saying anything more meaningful (further that scientists cannot agree what to measure) than arguments for brain volume alone. For if Dinosaurs like Ultrasaurius, Diplodocus, etc., can function with a large 'body' to small brain volume, then the larger brains of humans along with some Cetaceans must have evolved (Latin evolutio-onem, evolve: to unfold, adapted, changed, developed, etc) for a purpose other than brain-body functioning.
Cetacean brains appear similar to the human brain in that they have large cerebral hemispheres folded in a
Figure 10-1.
Tursiops Truncatus Brain.
Figure 12-4.
Sections through Tursiops Truncatus Brain.
IC: Inferior Colliculus; SC: Sylvian cleft.
Figure 15-7.
Relative size between Tursiops Truncatus Brain with others including Humans; Tursiops Truncatus Brain sections through cortex to cerebellum.
Figure 18-9.
Tursiops Truncatus Brain sections laterally through mid-brain.
Figure 20-1.
Tursiops Truncatus Brain sections laterally through
mid-brain.
complex way, though even larger. Furthermore the neo-cortex of the brain, the part with which we create, innovate, 'reason' (Latin ratiōnem: infer [Latin inferre, to bring: higher order abstraction based on the 'facts' from observation(s)], 'think' [Greek denkem, 'reason'], theorize, symbolize, formulating [formula, from Latin forma: verbal-mathematical abstracting], etc., of higher orders of abstracting), etc., covers 98 percent of the dolphins cortex, higher even than in humans; though Evans (1987) reports that the cortex appears thinner than in humans. Further differences includes degree of folding, zonal differentiation along with neurone (nerve cell) organization (density, etc), where the microscopic architecture differs not only to that of a human, but to other mammals too. Indeed some Cetacean species appear to possess unusual 'mental' processes. Indicating that this appears the result of differences in environmental (French environ, round about: surrounding events from Latin ēventus, to happen: occurrences, happenings, etc., in an environment) functioning. Indeed our brain organizes around vision as our primary experience source, whereas Cetaceans primary sense involves acoustics, through sonar echo-location: their world involves a four-dimensional (Latin dīmensio from dīmetīri, to measure: measurable extent, in terms of length, breadth, height, thickness, etc; combining 'space' from Latin spatium: continuous extension, usually assumed as a 3-dimensional void, with 'time' from Latin tempus: interval(s) involving relations of a sequence of events, changes, etc., where 'space' represents an interval of 'time', but not 'empty', hence interchangeable with 'time', after Albert Einstein (1905), with Hermann Minkowski (1908), via fullness of changing 'matter', otherwise 4-dimensional space-time) mosaic of 'sound'. As Alpers (1960) states:
"As to the various senses - of smell, touch, sight, and hearing - the nerve connections of a dolphin's brain show exactly what they might be expected to: that there is not much sense of smell, if any at all, and the sense of touch is little used; but the sight nerve is relatively large, and the hearing nerve is larger still, indicating special development of the auditory sense; likewise, the areas of the brain that receive these nerves reflect the same thing". Watson (1981) further suggests:
"Differences that do exist in general brain architecture have to do with the obvious differences in life-style and behavior between us and them. Our cerebral anatomy is similar, but our best-developed areas are those which deal with the elaboration of motor skills made possible by our hands, while cetaceans seem to concentrate on areas of social perception. Dolphins show marked development of those parts of the brain responsible for orientation, social skill, emotional self-control and perhaps even humour. Unlike us, they seem to have responded to social and sexual pressures rather than to the purely physical".
Nevertheless, those amongst the Cetaceans that particularly stand out as sentient candidates (from observations, research, etc) include Sperm whales, Hump-back whales (Megaptera Novaeangliae), Orcas (Orcinus Orca), Bottle-nose along with Pan-tropical Spotted dolphins (Stenella Attenuata, Frontalis).
Jacques Yves Couteau with Yves Paccalet (1988) states in relation to Sperm whale brain size:
"At 20 pounds (later tabled at 28 pounds) the spherical brain is not only proportionately much larger than that of baleen whales, but the largest of any creature that has ever lived".
When hunted by whaling ships equipped with depth-sounding equipment that could locate them, Sperm whales would swim to the deep scattering layer. A layer of mid-water fish providing an acoustic hiding place, making the whale invisible to the whaler's equipment. Further it often got reported in an earlier epoch that when sailing ships hunted Sperm whales, the Sperm whales would frequently swim into the wind. Indicating that the whales had realized that their pursuers could not sail to wind-ward, thus demonstrating an understanding of causal relationships in problem-solving.
Usually male-both-female Sperm whales help each other without hesitation, further members of a pod will take concerted 'action' when threatened. But more interestingly Sperm whales show self-sacrificing 'behavior'. Whalers employ a technique of harpooning a calf to catch the adult, since Sperm whale mothers will vigorously defend their young. During such dramas whalers have often reported that mothers self-sacrifice themselves in place of their calves, though it is not clear as to whether this may remain coincidental. Further when danger threatens, the dominant bull ("school-master") will make it his business to get involved. These bulls become known to take hold of a calf in their jaws, lifting it out of the water so that the whalers cannot get to it. This extreme form of succourless 'behavior' got reported by whalers on several occasions, remaining virtually unknown elsewhere in nature. Further Watson (1981), reports on another method used by whalers to catch Sperm whales, again taking advantage of Sperm whales' self-sacrificing 'behavior':
"One of the stimuli which sparks the response seems to be a distress call. There are several accounts of animals coming to the aid of an individual that was clearly out of sight: for example, a report of a group of Great Sperm Whales turning suddenly to go to the side of another which had been harpooned 5 km (over 3 miles) away (Dulles 1973). In the days before explosive grenades, the whalers knew that a securely harpooned but not badly injured whale was the best possible lure for enticing others within shooting range. They record that this device worked on all Great Sperm Whales inside a circle with a radius of 6 km (Robbins 1899)".
Sperm whales appear able to communicate to each other using pulsed clicks over great distances, using the deep SOFAR ("Sound Fixing And Ranging") channel, in a frequency range of 100-30,000 Hz. William Watkins with William Schevill (1977) considered that these clicks (codas) had a personal signature, while Jonathan Gordon along with colleagues have found that the pattern of clicks made by an individual often changes markedly.
The song of Hump-back whales, often becomes cited as an example of Mysticeti (baleen) whale 'behavior' that may involve sentience. They appear equivalent to human songs, communicating via their own language. Producing moans, groans, etc., involving a frequency range of 40 Hz to 5 KHz, detected by hydrophones over 30 km away. They may last from 6-35 minutes before repeating, continuing through 24 hours with only brief one minute pauses for breath. Howard with Lois Winn (1978) recorded one whale in the Caribbean, singing non-stop for at least 22 hours. The basic unit of the song involves a syllable sounding as 'cries', 'yups', 'chirps', etc. Each syllable becomes equivalent to a note of music, where 20 such syllables have become recognized. Syllables got grouped into small repeating sequences termed phrases, while groups of similar phrases become termed themes (like those of Birds), which there appears six basic themes. The motifs with phrases may become repeated, though the individual phrases can vary considerably in length. However because of the whale songs 'repetitious' content, they appear to lack the information content that a language usually possesses. However Roger Payne (1983) reports that Hump-back songs appear to continuously vary, progressive-both-rapid, where each component perhaps changing within two months; where an entire song gets changed after about eight years. Yet since these songs appear easily recalled from previous seasons, then these modifications may instead occur for example, as a result of the song of a new arrival. Appearing connected to the function of mating (though uncertain), since the singers invariably involve males. As reported by Watson (1981):
As reported by Watson (1981):
"Known baleen-whale sounds seem to fall into four basic categories:
(i). Low-frequency moans up to thirty seconds long,
with fundamental frequencies between 20 and
200 Hz, either pure tone, as in the 20-cycle
sounds of Fin Whales, or more complex with a
strong harmonic structure.
(ii). Short thumps or knocks also under 200 Hz, but
less than a second long, now known to be
produced by Great Right, Bowhead, Grey, Fin and
Piked whales.
(iii). Chirps and whistles which change frequency
rapidly but are always above 1,000 Hz and less
than one tenth of a second long. These may be
pure tones or involve harmonics, and seem to be
produced by most baleen whales.
(iv). Clicks with a frequency as high as 30 kHz,
lasting less than one hundredth of a second.
These have now been recorded for Grey, Fin,
Blue, Sei, Tropical and Humpback whales.
The 'thump trains' of Piked Whales, the moans of Fin Whales and the Whistles of Humpback Whales all have distinctive frequencies and repetition rates which make it possible for human listeners, and therefore presumably whales, to recognize individual animals over great distances. A Blue Whale's whistle recorded at 188 decibels is the loudest sound ever known to be produced by any living source and, with power exceeding that even of a passing jet plane (usually between 140 and 170 decibels), will certainly travel considerable distances underwater (Cummings & Thompson 1971). Even the relatively small Piked Whale has a song recorded at 152 decibels (Beamish & Mitchell 1973). The acoustic range of high-amplitude, low-frequency moans produced by Fin Whales may be great enough to span an entire ocean (Payne & Webb 1971).
We still know little about the function of sound in baleen whales, but it is difficult to over-estimate the value of such signals in a three-dimensional environment, in which visibility is necessarily restricted. They could provide information about identity, position, reproductive state, population size, the availability of food and the presence of predators. Singing Humpback Whales, for instance, simply because they are singing, can be assumed to be solitary, male, ready to mate, uninterested in food and undisturbed by predators. The song, now known to vary with time and place, tells even human listeners that the animal producing it is, for instance, part of the western Atlantic 'herd', singing near Bermuda, in April 1970 (Thompson et al 1979)".
However, Hump-back whales have perfected an ingenious technique for catching Herring, Krill, etc.: they literally blow nets of air bubbles. The first scientists to witness this 'behavior' involved Virginia with Charles Jurasz, off the coast of Alaska. Roger Payne (1979) working with them describes it thus:
"Like a giant undersea spider spinning its web the Hump-back begins perhaps 50 feet deep, forcing bursts of air through its blow holes while swimming in an upward spiral. Big bubbles, followed by a mist of tiny ones, rise to create a cylindrical screen that concentrates Herring. Bubbles and food pop to the surface, followed by the gaping mouth of the whale as it emerges in the centre of its net".
According to Charles with Virginia Jurasz, on some occasions two whales may work together forming a net that can stretch as much as 30 metres across; ordinarily the diameter of the net does not exceed 3-5 metres. Payne observes that unlike spiders with their webs:
"Whales can select the size of the bubbles. They can make their nets any size 'mesh' they want".
Payne further recorded sound sequences produced while the whales blow their bubble nets, whose precise function remains unknown.
Hump-backs further have other techniques to corral schools of Herring, etc. They have used their huge flippers to herd their prey. Another method known as flick-feeding involves splashing water over their heads with their flukes, so that the water lands in front of them as they swim. Such that the impact of the water startles the Herring long enough for the whale to swallow them. Hump-backs therefore demonstrate adaptability in tool-use with flippers, water (flukes of tail to toss water), bubbles, etc.
Whilst Orcas have become observed co-operating to create waves sufficient to top Sea Lions off ice flows in Antarctic waters, hence demonstrating social communication. Further in Argentina Orcas have become observed intentionally stranding themselves to catch Sea Lions, a technique that these whales teach their young. Yet surprisingly one such Orca got observed stranding itself in order to aid a Sea Lion pup back ashore.
Whereas the case for the sentience of Bottle-nose dolphins appears just as remarkable, with far more extensive evidence in support due to the varieties of in-depth research along with observations made recently. The evidence will become reviewed in more detail later, but here in brief. Bottle-nose dolphins have a large brain comparable to humans. Ken Marten, Karim Shariff, Suchi Psarakos with Don J. White (1996) have reported self-awareness, recognition of themselves, creativity along with inventiveness in play. Louis Herman (1989) has demonstrated the learning along with understanding of the rules of a language. Denise Herzing (1996) of Florida Atlantic University asserts evidence for complex social relationships. Further reports on the various uses of the dolphin echo-location as tools. Randall Wells' research group at Sarasota bay Florida, have determined that whistles form the basis for recognition along with communication. M. Bryde with Richard Harrison (1988), have described a possible candidate for an example of
Figure 22-3.
Hump-back whales corral Herring, Krill, etc., by bubble-nets. Jacques-Yves Cousteau, Yves Paccalet (1986) "Jacques Cousteau Whales".
Figure 24.
Orca intentionally stranding themselves to catch young Sea Lion pups.
self-sacrifice. Further giving examples of tool-use along with problem-solving involving an understanding of causal relationships. However perhaps most intriguingly, reports that Bottle-nose dolphins can undo knots that fishermen tie at the ends of trawler's nets; demonstrating an understanding of how the net gets held together. Further reports of self-sacrificing 'behavior' become made by J.B. Siebenaler along with D.K. Caldwell (1956).
Now what becomes apparent from the above, involves observed uncommon differences in 'behaviors' from that of other creatures, which we may use to define sentience functionally (Latin, functiōnem): to do, perform, operate, etc.; function of - how values relate; infinite-valued, differential-integration, non-linear-asymmetry-non-additive. Therefore the obvious candidates so far appear as self-awareness, language, problem-solving, tool-use, creativity, complex social co-operation or-both relationships along with self-sacrifice.
However the collecting-both-collating of evidence though problematic, is not enough. The slaughtering along with the disregard for our environments will not just stop, because those involved remain concerned with their own agendas. For example, the Japanese continue to kill whales in the name of research (a loop-hole in the United Nations agreement), in order to feed Japan's markets. While continued developments in fishing nets-both-techniques in catching Tuna, continue to drown dolphins in the hundreds. Yet confusion over the definitions of such terms as sentience, awareness, 'consciousness' along with 'intelligence', only serves to obscure matters further.
Sentience usually gets defined as for example by Julia Swannell (1989) as: "that feels or is capable of feeling". Where 'feeling' comes from Greek palamē, to perceive by 'touch', 'sense of': 'affected' (Latin affectāre, to do: referring to 'feelings'; otherwise influence, bring to bear, etc), moved, related to 'emotion' (Latin ēmōtio-ōnem from ēmovēre, to move: orders of 'affect'); hence irritability: 'feeling(s)' has multi-ordinal (ordinal: defines a values order else position in an 'aggregate': multi-ordinality, defines a value's order, relation to others, etc., in a degree process, continuum, etc.; having multi-meaning, contextual to level of abstracting) 'meaning' entailing the interchangeable perceiving(s) (Latin percipere, to take: sensing, representing [percepts] via 'sensory' processes: 'visual', 'auditory', 'taste', 'olfactory', with 'tactile')-'emotion(s)'. Perhaps unsurprisingly since no one seems to know what constitutes sentience, apart from what appears uncontroversial. Despite that as any pet owner will claim unreservedly, their cats, dogs, etc., have 'feelings'. Instead James Drever (1952) gives sentience as:
"...the capacity or property of receiving stimuli; the primitive (hypothetical) limit of consciousness".
Ascribing 'consciousness' though reluctantly. Why, well a scrutiny of 'stimulus' will not provide a clarification, any more than Swannell's 'feelings'. 'Stimulus' comes directly from Latin, entailing an energy change, objects, events originating a 'response' from Latin respondēre to respond, the 'muscular or glandular reactions'; involving false-to-facts single causality: 'cause (Latin causa: produces, induces, etc) to effect' (Latin effectus: consequence, result, etc). Such as the 'behaviorist-cognitive' (asserts that a 'response' relates to 'stimulus' via an intervening factor - purpose) approach allows, excluding 'mental' (Latin mentālis: of 'mind' from Greek menos, rage; else psuchē, soul: emergent 'conscious' functioning) phenomena (Greek phainomenon, to show: abstraction(s), representation(s), etc., causal by noumena from Greek nooumenon, to apprehend: things-in-themselves, the event(s); such as the interchangeable feeling-thinking, after Alfred Korzybski (1933)) along with 'consciousness' in favour of what can become observed, measured, etc. This remains therefore 'elementalistic' (Latin elementum from Greek Stoichia, to 'analyse' [from Greek analusis, to loosen: to find 'elements'], 'atomize', etc., 'el': divide to the indivisible parts, the non-separable, contextually interchangeable whole(s) from part(s)), not including the whole event by assuming single causation. Disregarding the formation of a Gestalt (German: after Max Wertheimer (1912), form [shape, hence 'figure'], pattern, configuration, unity, whole [combination of parts], organization [Greek organon, instrument else 'logic': an instrument for organizing knowledge; system of principles, rules of investigation, 'logic', validity {in this sense truth-falsity}, etc.; otherwise to make whole, equivalent to abstraction, representation, gestalt, etc], representation, etc., hence emergence thus structure [Latin structūra from struere, to build]: emergent from ordered [Latin, ordinem: arrangement, disposition in space-time] relations Latin relātus, to refer: way in which a thing connects with; may become formulated in regard to another as dependence-interdependence, similarity-difference, correspondence-contrast, reversible-interchangeable-equivalent-over-lapping, more-or-less, etc]; equivalent to gestalt, whole, representation, etc) along with the varying situational necessities-consequences, involving non-elementalistic (ēl, non-el, after Lao-Tse (600 B.C.), over-lapping, interchangeable [equivalent, reversible, etc], functional [non-linear-asymmetry-non-additive] packets, etc., emergent, holism) multi-causal (that 'effect(s)' usually have many 'causes', interchangeable because the 'effect(s)' can become 'cause(s)') packets. Where gestalt theory of causality, after Max Werthiemer (1912), formulates that events get made up of an 'effect', which becomes a part of the whole, configuration, etc., of ordered relations, hence emerges from 'causes': multi-causality. Whilst A.M. MacDonald (1949) provides a more assertive definition for sentience:
"Conscious capable of sensation, responsive to stimulus".
Though as discussed we should now expect to include further components, other than 'consciousness' alone.
However the problem with the terms 'consciousness' along with awareness may now shed more light upon the timid definitions of sentience. When considering the term 'conscious or awareness', one becomes inevitably led to ask of what contextually? Yet as to what it means 'to be conscious or aware', 'philosophers' (Greek philosophos: "Science of Sciences", after Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814); pursuit of knowledge [experience], hence wisdom), 'psychologists' (Greek psuchē, soul; logos, discourse: Science concerned with functions of animals as an organism-as-a-whole-in-an-environment), etc., continue to speculate. Meanwhile definitions of conscious (Latin conscius, aware) else awareness (as in observant, etc), have used one to define the other for example emergent self-awareness else self-consciousness. Of these perhaps the clearest gets provided by Arthur S. Reber (1988):
"Awareness...being cognizant or conscious of something".
Further,
"In its most general sense the term is used to characterize the mental state of an individual who is capable of
(a). having sensation and perceptions,
(b). reacting to stimuli,
(c). having feelings and emotions,
(d). having thoughts, ideas, plans and images and
(e). being aware of (a) through (d)".
However Alfred Korzybski (1933) clarifies the situation, the following quotes come from "Science And Sanity".
"The term 'consciousness', taken separately, is not a complete symbol; it lacks content and one of the characteristics of 'consciousness' is to have some content".
"For this 'consciousness of something' I take consciousness of abstracting as fundamental".
Where Korzybski defines abstracting (Latin abstractus, to draw) as representing (stands for, corresponds to, depicts, shows, etc., equivalent terms include, organizing, configuration, etc) of events by objects (object from Latin objectāre: thing, 'figure', organized whole, gestalt of an external event), signs (Latin signum: mark, token, 'picture', motion, gesture, cue, symptom, indication, symbol, etc.; interchangeable with symbol as token representing something), symbols (Greek sumbolon, token: mark, character, letter, sign, etc), etc., for example, perceiving, visualizing (to replay the 'visual' part of the perceptual process, as 'mental images' ['picturing']; to imagine the possible both-others impossible, as for example what might have happened from actual events transpired), words, formulas, etc., depending on level of abstracting. As Korzybski (1933) elaborates:
"Smith not only abstracts in indefinite numbers of different orders and does it automatically and habitually, but if he enquires he may also become conscious of abstracting - 'is not all'; and 'this is not this'".
"We can now define 'consciousness of abstracting' as awareness that in our process of abstracting we have left out characteristics. Or consciousness of abstracting can be defined as remembering the 'is not' and that some characteristics have been left out".
Therefore Korzybski's (1933) consciousness of abstracting, becomes equivalent (contextually similar in value(s), hence ēl, interchangeable, etc) to an empirical (Greek empeiros, experienced: after John Locke (1690), epistemology [Greek epistēmē, knowledge: the justification of values] asserting that our values come from facts, hence via senses) order of evaluating (French évaluer: determine the value [Latin valēre, of worth: estimate in exchange, equivalent of a thing, represents else substituted for, etc., hence thing represented, etc], hence representing: after Alfred Korzybski (1933), event(s)-insight-logic) avoiding 'identification(s)': Korzybski's (1933) term for treating an abstraction, anything, etc., as the 'same' (Greek homos, 'identical': not other, different; exactly alike, undifferentiated in 'all' respects), by the ignoring ('filtering' out) of facts: observations (Latin observāre, to keep: representation of facts by perceiving, 'description(s)', etc.; of non-verbal levels), observed actualities, what happened; of non-verbal events. In other words the consequence of monitoring involves an emergent realization (gestalt of) that these abstractions (internal events as representations) of noumena (things-in-themselves, of external events, causal of phenomena), will not be other than imperfect, incomplete representations, not having the 'same' components, characteristics, parts, etc. Whereas self-awareness (consciousness of self) will therefore emerge from the monitoring of processes involving in observing-inferring-formulating phenomena, which may occasionally appear related to the self. Further becoming an important proof for consciousness of abstracting, since at the most basic any evidence will most likely constitute demonstrations of self-awareness.
Nevertheless apart from my reservations concerning 'stimulus and response', Reber's condition (b) cannot be a 'reaction'. But a transacting (Latin transactus; trans, over, beyond, cross-wise, etc.; actus, to 'act'): to do, to exchange, perform in give-and-take transformations, etc.; following J. Samuel Bois (1966), replacing Isaac Newton's (1687) 'el reaction' (as from law third of motion: 'equal and opposite reaction'), otherwise 'response', etc., as apart of an evaluational (semantic) transacting: Bois' (1966) term, replacing evaluational (semantic) reaction (Alfred Korzybski's (1933) original term for feeling(s)-thinking-action(s)-with-an-environment; however trailing Isaac Newton's (1687) 'reaction'). Further involving a correction to evaluating because Korzybski (1935), became increasing concerned with avoiding the folk-(mis)meanings involving semantics (Greek semainein, sign): introduced by Michel Bréal (1897), to 'signify', value, 'mean', etc., dealing with 'meaning' in language. Therefore my preference involves Bois' (1966) seven clusters (from "The Art Of Awareness"), in place of Reber's list concerning content (Latin contentus, to contain: comprising of, abstracted as experience, etc) of consciousness.
"As a first step, we put aside the standard definition of Homo Sapiens, such as, 'rational animal' or any of its present-day equivalents, as for example, 'the naked ape'. We see a human individual as a continuously transacting and expanding process that includes seven clusters of activities:
(1). electrochemical;
(2). sensory-motor;
(3). feelings;
(4). thinking;
(5). environing (ecologically and psychosocially);
(6). memory guided; and
(7). anticipative of the future".
Attempts to define 'intelligence' (Latin intellectus, as 'intelligent': that involving 'reasoning', involving understanding, etc.; distinguished from 'feelings', 'willing', etc) by researchers have only led to a confused mess. Intending to impose 'innate' (Latin innātus, to be born: inherited; passed on, thus known before birth; hence nature: physical-wild-world; otherwise 'innate' factors, that inherited) factors as an 'emotional' preference. Falsely passing disagreement, lack of convincing evidence, etc., for an 'innate, fixed, intelligence' as a lack of clarification from, such that despite innumerable tests available for measuring 'intelligence', yet no one knows what 'intelligence' constitutes nor what these numerous tests measure.
The "Journal Of Educational Psychology", published an article in volume 12, entitled "Intelligence And Its Measurement: A Symposium” in 1921. Within which they reported how 'psychologists' formulate 'intelligence' along with how it can best become measured. Fourteen replied with definitions of 'intelligence' such as the following:
(1). "The power of good responses from the point of
view of truth or fact" (E.L. Thorndike);
(2). "The ability to carry on abstract thinking"
(L.M. Terman);
(3). "Having learned or ability to learn to adjust
oneself to the environment" (S.S. Colvin);
(4). "The ability to adapt oneself adequately to
relatively new situations in life"
(R. Pintner);
(5). "The capacity for knowledge, and knowledge
possessed" (V.A.C. Henmon);
(6). "A biological mechanism by which the effects of
a complexity of stimuli are brought together
and given a somewhat unified effect in
behavior" (J. Petersen);
(7). "The capacity to inhibit an instinctive
adjustment, the capacity to redefine the
inhibited instinctive adjustment in the light
of imaginally experienced trial and error, and
the volitional capacity to realize the modified
instinctive adjustment into overt behavior to
the advantage of the individual as a social
animal" (L.L. Thurstone);
(8). "The capacity to acquire capacity"
(H. Woodrow);
(9). "The capacity to learn or to profit by
experience" (W.F. Dearborn).
While others did not answer the questions directly. Alternatively for example Edwin Boring (1923) defines 'intelligence' as "whatever it is that the tests measure".
The confusion has not clarified significantly since. Perhaps not surprisingly, if we recognize that there remains a hidden agenda behind 'intelligence' research since Francis Galton's (1822-1911) studies in 1884. Specifically that those who have power (influence, etc) want to keep it despite the deprivations, crimes against sentience, etc., it creates; justifying this by proclaiming a right based on superior genes (Greek genesis, to be born: hereditary [Latin hērēditātem, heir: tendency to transmit genetic characteristics from parent(s) to offspring] factor, controlling particular inherited characteristic, etc.; or-both involving hard-work), factors which remain over-whelmingly important over environmental factors: experience(s) (knowledge, know from Greek gignōskein: to have experience of, hence experience), circumstance(s), etc., hence nurture: environmental factors, of experience, etc. A 'class-ism', which later expanded into insidious, pernicious, 'racism'.
Nevertheless several of the definitions appear to share the capacity to learn (insight formation, process of establishing new organized wholes; otherwise usually involving 'conditionality', though unhealthily; etc) from experiences along with adaptation (Latin adaptus, fit: fit, to adjust, modify, alter, etc., change to fit changing surroundings) to an environment. However searching for common denominators amongst definitions will only serve to mislead us, if an important relation becomes missed. To this end Drever (1952) clarifies the situation giving 'intelligence' as: "The relating activity of mind; insight as understood by the Gestalt Psychologists; in its lowest terms intelligence is present where the individual, animal or human being, is aware, however dimly, of the relevance of his behavior to an objective; many definitions of what is really indefinable have been attempted by Psychologists, of which the least unsatisfactory are:
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